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Abstract: Heeding recent calls to explore the contributions of creative
political actors other than federal judges to the process of American legal
development, this article examines the role of state attorneys general (SAGs)
during the period of rapid industrialization of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Consistent with recent revisionist accounts concerning
the extent of government power during this era of supposed "laissez-faire," I
find that SAGs during this period actively and creatively employed ancient
common law legal theories in new ways to address the emerging corporate
order during this time. Relying on a review of state court cases and
newspaper accounts from the period, I examine how SAGs pursued the
"public interest" by seeking injunctions against businesses and even corporate
dissolution through their use of public nuisance and quo warranto theories.
This litigation served as a form of regulation through litigation at a time in
which administrative solutions were lacking and also influenced statutory
developments during the period.
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The Gilded Age of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries has been the focus of a long and often contentious line of
legal scholarship examining the relationship between American law,
politics, and the economy. Overlooking much of this historiography
have been the works of Charles Beard, Frank Goodnow, and other
early Progressives who argued that a "laissez-faire constitutionalism"
exemplified law during the Gilded Age.1 In this conception, law and
legal institutions fundamentally entrenched liberal laissez-faire
economic doctrines during this period, highlighted most clearly by the
Supreme Court's infamous 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York.
Similarly, scholars such as Morton Horwitz argued that the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the crystallization
of "Classical Legal Thought" in American law, embracing ideas
compatible with "laissez-faire liberalism" and the "night watchman
state."2 This flowed from the gradual development of the common law
in the decades prior to the Civil War, which subsidized private
enterprise at the expense of weaker and less organized groups.3
Christopher Tomlins argues that there was a shift from the Founding
and the early nineteenth century from a democratized ideology of the
communal good represented in the discourse of police powers to an
emphasis on judge-made common law promoting stability and
providing protection from "democratic excess."4
While this interpretation of law during the Gilded Age dominated
post-World War II historical accounts of the era and remains strong in
contemporary scholarship,5 other scholars have challenged this view.
The rethinking of this era began with the work of Charles McCurdy,
Alan Jones, and others and has continued to the present.6 William
Novak, for example, emphasized the importance of the salus populi
("the people’s welfare") existing in the early American state.7 In a
similar vein, Howard Gillman argued that the law of the Lochner Era
was not simply a reflection of unrestrained free-market ideology on the
part of federal judges, but contained principled distinctions based upon
a vision of republican citizenship dating back to the Founders. Gillman
notes that courts were concerned not with all regulations, but only
those that promoted "class" or partial interests of particular groups
rather than the general welfare.8 Gerald Berk argued that two distinct
paths to industrialization contended during the Gilded Age. The first
reflected a laissez-faire corporate liberalism emphasizing the private
sphere over the public, but the second was a competing model of
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"regional republicanism" that "conceived property and the corporation
to be public conventions." According to Berk, law in the late nineteenth
century reflected both of these alternative tracks to industrialization.9
In the view of these scholars, the American state was stronger
and more interventionist than suggested by the assumptions of
"laissez-faire" dominance during the Gilded Age. They also suggest
that law during the period is best characterized not as a constitutional
limit on the growth of the American state, but as a creative and
distinctive source of governmental authority.10 As Novak argued, "the
technologies of American state development and regulation in this
period were overwhelmingly legal in nature and in practice," "in
contrast to the dominant techniques and strategies of continental
European statecraft." Rather than impeding state economic controls,
American law provided innovative tools with which to redefine
government-business relationships.11
This reinterpretation of the role of law during the Gilded Age has
occurred alongside a call for scholars to reconsider the judge-focused
nature of legal scholarship concerning this period. As Novak put it,
legal scholarship has too often "fetishized courts and judges and
radically understated the role of other creative lawmakers in the
American tradition."12 A narrow focus on judges threatens to obscure
the role of creative and entrepreneurial legal actors who have also had
a significant impact on the direction of American legal development.
In this article, I suggest that a closer examination of the
important if often underappreciated role played by one set of these
entrepreneurial legal actors – state attorneys general (SAGs) – will
help to fill in more of the picture of the role of law during the Gilded
Age. In particular, the ways in which SAGs mobilized legal authority
during the Gilded Age help to illustrate how law could be used as a
creative force for stronger and more forceful governmental
intervention. It also illustrates that whatever the position of the federal
courts – frequently portrayed as largely adopting laissez-faire
ideologies – other legal actors at the state level, including SAGs and
state judges, were attuned to a republican rather than laissez-faire
view of corporate authority. During this period, several SAGs wrestled
with the question of how to address the intense public demand for
control of the commercial sector while often lacking the express
authority to act. Their solution lay in the novel use of their common
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law powers, which aimed at regulating these new entities in the name
of the "public interest."
While the SAGs' innovative use of common law litigation ran into
barriers as a way of effectively regulating the emerging national
economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their
activities during this period are important for several reasons. First, in
line with contemporary scholarship, it indicates the creative nature of
law during this period. Faced with new problems linked to emerging
industrialization and a lack of administrative solutions, SAGs used
innovative litigation to pursue regulatory controls on business.
Applying old principles of the common law to address new issues,
SAGs achieved injunctions against business and dissolution of
corporate charters during this time in the name of the public interest. I
suggest that this use of the common law served to advance a certain
republican conception of government-business relations, in contrast to
assumptions of common law as a method of entrenching "laissez-faire"
values. The SAGs fit the "public interest" mold particularly well since
they were tasked with pursuing the general interest in their litigation,
and not merely the special class interests of any particular group. This
activity illustrates the common law as reflecting democracy and not
simply serving as a tool of industry or as protection against
"democratic excess."
Second, this focus on state-level political development fits into
Julie Novkov's call for "bringing the states back in" to American
political development.13 These litigation campaigns illustrate how
entrepreneurial political actors used their position to channel political
discontent in a way helping influence the development of common and
statutory law on the state and federal level. Because of the SAGs'
unique institutional position, these state litigators were able to serve
as opportunity points for the expression of the “public interest” in the
absence of administrative mechanisms or actions by other political
institutions. Relying on the common law and using their position as the
legal representatives of their state to get into court, these SAGs acted
against major business entities in the absence of explicit legislative
command or the existence of a strong administrative state. These
actions helped to influence legal and statutory development on the
state and federal levels.
Third, the actions of SAGs during the Gilded Age help place the
high-profile activities of modern SAGs in more historical context.
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Several scholars have begun to explore the role of contemporary
SAGs,14 whose activities have included litigation aimed at regulating
tobacco companies, gun manufacturers, polluting energy firms, the
lead paint industry, and Wall Street companies. Nevertheless, little
scholarship examines the role of SAGs before the modern era.15 The
modern-day SAGs' use of the common law to regulate business in the
face of alleged administrative inaction has an analogue in their
predecessors' use of the common law to regulate business entities in a
time prior to the full-fledged administrative state. Further, it was
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the SAGs
first realized that pursuing the "public interest" against large
corporations required increasing collaboration among themselves,
leading to the creation of new mechanisms including the National
Association of Attorneys General – an organization that has played a
key role in contemporary multistate lawsuits.

The Office of the State Attorney General
The office of the attorney general traces its origins to medieval
England, where the King and other noblemen retained attorneys to
handle several governmental tasks. Several of the American colonies
established attorneys general early on in their existence, generally
retaining the office during the transition from colonies to states.
Several states placed the office in state constitutions and, unlike the
U.S. Attorney General, the office was transformed from an appointed
to elective position in most states beginning in the Jacksonian Era.16
The switch in selection method in most states to separate
statewide election offered SAGs a level of independence from other
state-level political institutions. Their separate statewide election
allowed them to be directly responsible to the people as opposed to
the governor or the state legislature. This autonomy was particularly
important because SAGs were (and are) singly responsible for most or
all of their state’s legal services.17 This ability to independently
represent the state's legal interests led one former New York Attorney
General, writing just before the start of the New Deal period, to note
that because of its place in state government, "the office of the
Attorney-General, of necessity, is most intimately associated to the
development of the law."18
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Most SAGs had broad common law powers inherent to the office
that were not specified constitutionally or statutorily and which could
be used in the name of the "public interest."19 As one Maine court
stated in the early twentieth century, the attorney general "is clothed
and charged with all the common-law powers and duties pertaining to
his office." This allowed SAGs to "exercise all such power and authority
as public interests may from time to time require, and may institute,
conduct, and maintain all such suits and proceedings as he deems
necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the states, the
preservation of order, and the protection of public rights."20
The common law powers SAGs retained when colonies became
states "were so numerous and varied as to discourage the framers of
the state constitutions and legislatures from setting them out in
complete detail," thus permitting the SAG to draw upon the long
common law traditions of English attorneys general to fill in gaps in
their express powers.21 Because of the breadth of these common law
powers, it is virtually impossible to list them comprehensively.22
Nevertheless, several early court cases give an indication of the sort of
powers the common law provided. One of the most important of such
cases is People v. Miner, a New York state court case decided in 1868.
The opinion lists several of the SAGs’ traditional common law powers,
including the broad ability to prosecute crimes and all actions
necessary for the "defense of property and revenues of the crown" as
well as specific powers he could use to target other wrongdoing
against the sovereign. Because of their application to corporations, I
focus on two of these powers for the purposes of this article. Under
English common law, attorneys general had the duty: first, "[b]y writ
of quo warranto, to determine the right of him who claims or usurps
any office, franchise or liberty, and to vacate the charter, or annul the
existence of a corporation, for violations of its charter, or for omitting
to exercise its corporate powers"; and second, "to prevent public
nuisances."23 Though People v. Miner was a state case from New York,
other state courts have frequently cited this enumeration to describe
the inherent powers of their respective SAGs.24
These common law powers played a particularly important role
for SAGs in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as several
wrestled with the question of how to best address the emergence of
big business during this period. In a foreshadowing of more recent
litigation, SAGs applied the common law in new and innovative ways,
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providing the legal justification for changes demanded in the name of
the "public interest." When courts and limited the possibilities of
successful business regulation with one particular common law tool
(such as public nuisance), SAGs would turn to others (such as quo
warranto) to achieve their regulatory goals.

State Attorneys General in the "Gilded Age"
As many scholars have documented, post-Civil War America
witnessed a number of substantial societal and economic changes,
including a tremendous burst of industrialization. The rise of big
business during this "Gilded Age" stirred feelings both of pride and
anxiety among Americans.25 Even as the positive side of economic
development led to optimism about future progress, the downsides of
rapid business growth led to calls for greater regulation of business.
As Howard Gillman has written, this period was one in which
much tension existed between older republican notions and the
emerging industrial state. The transformation of the economy began
eroding "the assumption about market liberty and republican
independence that justified the prohibition against factional or class
politics."26 The cherished image of the independent and self-employed
artisan or farmer increasingly gave way to the reality of a growing
number of Americans employed by others. While government
intervention in the economy had been most commonly associated with
"the capacity of special interests to interfere" with natural market
relations,27 the rise of the "new power" of these great corporations
prompted a rethinking of the government's role in promoting the
public interest.
The role that SAGs could play in helping along this rethinking in
this era of the emergence of rapid industrialization was the subject of
a particularly interesting decision authored by Judge Edward Ryan of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Attorney General v. The Chicago and
Northwestern Railway Co. (1874). In this case, the Wisconsin Attorney
General sued two railroad companies, seeking to prevent them from
charging fees in excess of the maximum rates allowed by a statute
enacted the same year. The companies replied with several
constitutional defenses, including that the statute was a violation of
the takings clause, the Contract Clause, and due process under the
state and federal Constitutions. Against these individual rights claims,
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the SAG argued that though the railroads were funded by private
investment, they were essentially "public" businesses because the
companies’ charters were granted by the state legislature, a public
body. The charter could be altered and even revoked if abused by the
recipient of the charter, because the granting of the corporate charter
implied that the corporation must operate consistent with notions of
the public interest. Implicit in the SAG’s argument was the notion that
his office was the appropriate entity to enforce this conception of the
railroad companies as "public" companies.28
In a lengthy decision, Judge Ryan sided with the attorney
general. Relying in part on an analysis of English common law, he
noted that the attorney general had the power to act when "any
corporation is doing acts detrimental to the public welfare, or hostile to
public policy." According to Judge Ryan, the common law of England
and America alike now confronted "a new power, unknown to its
founders, practically too strong for its ordinary private remedies." This
"new power" was the emergence of the great corporations, those
"aggregations of capital and power," with influence so large "that few
private persons could litigate with them."29 This change in
circumstances warranted the expansion of the common law power of
the attorney general to represent the public interest.
Judge Ryan’s decision highlights how the growth of corporate
power created stress in older notions of what the common law could
accomplish and what the public interest required. This new situation
demanded greater government oversight of business to ensure that
companies were acting in the public interest. As Judge Ryan realized,
SAGs could be key players in representing the public interest against
the "new power" of the great corporations. And indeed they were, as a
number of entrepreneurial SAGs increasingly used the common law as
a way to regulate corporations. They took advantage of their position
as their state’s chief legal officer to counter the downsides of business
growth, whether this came in the form of pollution affecting public
waters, harmful activities of railroad corporations, or monopolies that
worked as "conspiracies against the public."
The SAGs’ role as frequent foes of corporate entities in this era
occurred before the emergence of full-scale bureaucratization and
before the explosion of federal statutes targeting corporate behavior in
the twentieth century. The following two sections examine how the
SAGs used two common law principles – public nuisance and quo
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warranto – to regulate powerful business entities. I chose to pursue
my examination in this way because if the SAGs were indeed
important political players as Judge Ryan anticipated, then we would
expect them to be active against two of the key emerging business
entities emerging during the nineteenth century – the railroads and
the trusts. A closer look at the period demonstrates that SAGs were
indeed active against these entities, using the common law not as a
conservative tool for the privileged but as a legal weapon in the fight
to maintain public control over rising corporate power.

Public Nuisance as a Regulatory Device
Several of the earliest suits brought by SAGs to regulate the
new business entities relied upon public nuisance theories. Nuisance
actions, alleging unlawful use of property causing injury to others,
have long been recognized in the common law dating back to twelfthcentury England. English courts recognized early on a distinction
between "private" and "public" nuisance. Private nuisance grew out of
the law of property, and involved interference with the use of an
individual's real property. Public nuisance, by contrast, involved
activities interfering with the general rights of the public at large.
Unlike its private counterpart, public nuisance was linked with criminal
law, allowing public prosecutors to obtain injunctions against activities
harmful to the public. Under the common law, it was considerably
easier for public prosecutors to bring public nuisance actions than it
was for private parties, as any private individual seeking to abate
public nuisances was required to show "special injury" separate from
general harm to the public before an action could be sustained. Public
prosecutors were not subject to this limitation.30
William Novak notes that in American law, the "common law of
nuisance was one of the most important public legal doctrines of
nineteenth-century regulatory governance," reflecting the desire to
secure social order and the well-regulated society.31 Many of the early
examples in which American courts allowed the abatement of a public
nuisance involved situations in which persons obstructed public
highways or waterways, commonly known as "purprestures." Public
nuisance also targeted certain activities offending public morals, such
as gambling, prostitution, or the use of profane language.32 This usage
was similar to how English courts applied public nuisance.33
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As the enumeration contained in the previously mentioned
People v. Miner indicates, the general power to "prevent public
nuisances" was recognized in America as one of the several common
law powers within the purview of SAGs. The extent of this power,
however, was neither specified in any great detail nor subject to clear
limitation. As one deputy Attorney General remarked in recent times,
"[i]t requires only a little imagination to see the potential use an
Attorney General might make of his broad authority to seek abatement
of public nuisances."34 With the onset of industrialization in America,
and particularly after the Civil War, several SAGs engaged in efforts to
determine how far they could push their power to define a "public
nuisance" in the courts. These lawsuits helped regulate private
industry at a time in which the administrative state was in an early era
of development. As discussed below, SAGs found some level of success
using the notion of public nuisance to regulate the growing power of
businesses in the name of the "public interest."
SAGs used public nuisance to target an array of business
activities in the post-Civil War era. One usage occurred in an area we
might now recognize as environmental law. As Noga Morag-Levine
documents, the common law of nuisance was used to abate early
forms of environmental harms. This often arose in the context of
private nuisance, and included such situations as one individual suing
his neighbor for damages over the "noxious vapors" escaping from the
neighbor's animal pen.35 For environmental harms affecting the
interests of the public at large, SAG could and did use common law
public nuisance theories to enjoin allegedly harmful business activities.
A good example of this usage is the California case of People v.
Gold Run Ditch and Mining Co. (1884). This case involved a mining
company that was found by the SAG to be dumping sand and other
material from its mines into two rivers. The SAG sought an injunction
preventing the dumping, arguing that the accretion of materials in the
rivers threatened the destruction of immense tracts of land and the
navigability of the rivers. After the SAG obtained the desired injunction
from a lower court, the company appealed, claiming that the injunction
was invalid because the mine was simply operating as a legitimate
business and had acquired by prescription a private easement to use
the river as it pleased. The company also challenged the ability of the
SAG to bring this suit in the name of the public interest. The court
disagreed with the company’s reliance on individual right, noting that
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even a "legitimate private business…may grow into a force to threaten
the safety of the people" such that it "violates the rights that belong to
others." Further, analogizing the river to a public highway, the court
held that the river was possessed by the state as a "public trust for the
benefit of the people," and it was the purpose of the SAG to enforce
these rights on behalf of the public.36 As a result, the court sided with
the SAG and upheld the injunction prohibiting the company's practices.
SAGs successfully enforced such public rights against private
business even when the property being polluted was wholly under
private control. In People v. Truckee Lumber Co. (1897), the California
Attorney General sought an injunction to prevent a lumber company
from depositing wood shavings and other materials into a stream,
which had the effect of killing fish in the waters. The company claimed
that because it owned the property rights in the stream and the
surrounding lands, it was free to do what it wished, as its activities did
not involve any public interest. The court dismissed this argument,
holding that the pollution did involve the public interest, because the
killing of fish (even within wholly private property) affected the
availability of public fishing rights in the waters above and below the
privately held land. The court relied upon the "universal principle that
all property is held subject to those general regulations which are
necessary to the common good and general welfare." As in the Gold
Run case, the court stressed that the SAG had the power to bring this
action on the behalf of the broad public interest, without relying upon
a showing that any member of the public in fact had a complaint.37
SAGs in other states brought similar successful cases involving
what we might now recognize as "environmental law." This included
actions restraining an oil company from "wasting natural gas" in its
extraction procedures and enjoining an aqueduct company from
draining a pond in such a way that would "create and expose upon the
shores of said pond a large quantity of slime, mud and offensive
vegetation very detrimental to the public health."38 Because of the
absence of a bureaucratic regime empowered to tackle these various
emerging environmental problems, these common law public nuisance
actions aimed to fill in the resulting "regulatory gap."
In addition to its use as an early regulatory device to address
early environmental harms, SAGs sought to use public nuisance to
limit the powers of the largest and most prominent industries at the
time – the railroads. SAGs were an important and frequent courtroom
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foe of the railroads in the post-Civil War period, bringing hundreds of
lawsuits against the most important national industry at the time.39
Several of these cases relied upon common law public nuisance
theories to regulate various aspects of the industry.
The use of public nuisance against the railroads, as well as
against corporations generally, increased significantly during the last
couple of decades of the nineteenth century and into the Progressive
Era, eventually declining with the growth of the administrative state in
the New Deal period.40 A Lexis-Nexis search of state court decisions
revealed 106 separate common law public nuisance prosecutions
brought by SAGs against railroad corporations from 1865 to 1915.41
This number likely underestimates the total number of public nuisance
cases SAGs initiated against the railroads, because the Lexis-Nexis
database contains only appellate court decisions and neither
unappealed lower court decisions nor cases settled out of court. Even
this number reveals that SAGs prosecuted a number of cases against
the railroads during this period, using theories of public nuisance in the
name of the public interest. Moreover, a significant number of these
lawsuits were ultimately successful, with SAGs winning just over 60%
of these public nuisance lawsuits against railroad companies.
SAGs representing states across the country employed public
nuisance lawsuits against the railroads, led by Kentucky, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania.42 The sort of alleged nuisances targeted by SAGs
varied widely. Reflecting the earlier uses of public nuisance to abate
purprestures, some cases involved railroads allegedly obstructing
public highways or waterways in ways constituting public nuisances.43
SAGs also used the flexibility inherent in public nuisance to regulate
other aspects of the industry as well. The previously noted Wisconsin
case of Attorney General v. The Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co.
(1874) involved the SAGs' successful attempt to seek an injunction to
prevent a railroad from charging fees in excess of the maximum rates
allowed by a statute, despite the statute not explicitly allowing the
equitable remedy of an injunction.44 SAGs in other cases successfully
sought to enjoin railroads from charging excessive rates.45 Other
public nuisance lawsuits alleged that railroad companies were not
adequately maintaining their tracks or other structures,46 were using
freight cars rather than passenger cars on a particular rail line,47 had
allowed diseased animals from its cattle shipping station to enter the
state,48 that a train's "smoke from its engines, its ringing of bells, and
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its grinding of wheels" constituted a nuisance,49 and that a railroad
company had willingly allowed people to "engage in dancing, drinking,
tippling, cursing, swearing, being drunk, making loud noises and other
misbehavior" on land owned by the railroad.50
The use of public nuisance in particular was important in these
cases in part because, as discussed above, private individuals were
restrained in their use of public nuisance to remedy harms done to the
public. The common law of public nuisance also provided SAGs the
equitable remedy of injunction to restrain business activity, even if
existing statutory law allowed only modest fines for violations of their
provisions. In Hunt v. Chicago Horse and Dummy Railway Co. (1887),
for example, the Illinois Attorney General sought to restrain a railroad
company from constructing its railroad in certain streets of Chicago,
which the Chicago city council had granted to the companies via an
ordinance. The court agreed with the SAG that the city council’s action
violated a portion of the general (statewide) incorporation act, and
held the ordinance void. Importantly, the court held that the Attorney
General was empowered to bring this suit based on his power to
restrain public nuisances, despite no statute expressly granting him
this power.51
The public nuisance cases noted in this section help
demonstrate one way in which SAGs used the common law to promote
the "common good" and the public interest in the face of growing
business activities in the 19th century. It was in this latter part of the
nineteenth century that courts agreed with the role the SAG claimed in
pursuing the "public interest." SAGs were able to pursue claims that
essentially constituted an aggregation of private claims, but without
the necessity for any particular private entity actually raising any
claim. Indeed, because of the limitations courts placed on private
lawsuits against public nuisances, SAGs (as well as other public
prosecutors in a handful of states)52 were the only ones with the ability
to do so. The flexibility of the common law of public nuisance could be
and was used to regulate and restrain a variety of allegedly harmful
corporate behaviors in an era prior to the development of a strong
regulatory state.
Many SAGs, however, soon ran up against limitations in of the
public nuisance power as a tool to regulate business. As Noga MoragLevine notes, the use of the common law to abate environmental
harms became more problematic as those harms multiplied in the age
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of rapid industrialization.53 Additionally, some courts simply limited the
application of public nuisance in certain regulatory contexts. For
example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Attorney
General v. Tudor Ice Co. (1870), rejected the SAG’s attempt to bring a
public nuisance action against an ice company. The SAG had claimed
that the company’s trade in non-ice products (including lumber,
kerosene oil, and tobacco) went beyond the proper operations of an
ice company and thus represented a threat to the public. The court
disagreed, holding that since the ice company was a private trading
company and "not in any sense a trustee for public purposes," the
"acts complained of are not shown to have injured or endangered any
rights of the public, or of any individual or other corporation; and
cannot, upon any legal construction, be held to constitute a
nuisance."54
For these reasons, public nuisance was not capable of
addressing some of the issues arising with the growth of corporations
in the later nineteenth century. While public nuisance could be used as
a potentially a broad power to regulate the dumping of pollution or the
placement of buildings and railroad tracks, it proved incapable of
addressing a policy issue that incited great public attention and outcry
in the late nineteenth century – regulation of the trusts. SAGs'
attempts to do so required them to develop other parts of their
common law powers in innovative ways to vindicate the "public
interest" against the great private corporations, including the power of
quo warranto.

Quo Warranto and the Problem of the Trusts
The common law power of quo warranto, like public nuisance,
traces its roots back centuries to early English law. Under English
common law, the king’s attorney could issue a writ of quo warranto
"against one who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of
the crown, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in
order to determine the right." A franchise unable to show authority for
its exercise was liable to be seized by the king.55 This conception
evolved both in England and America to include the ouster of
individuals unlawfully claiming public office and, most relevant to this
discussion, the revocation of corporate charters if the attorney general
determined that the corporation abused the charter.56
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Before the commonplace use of general incorporation statutes,
most corporate entities had to receive special charters from their state
legislatures in order to carry on business in their state.57 This reflected
the view that the state's conferral of incorporation on corporations was
not simply for private benefit but to further the general welfare and
the public interest. Under this republican approach to corporate
practice, state officials could use the charter process to monitor
corporations and maintain a level of control over their activities.58
Through their use of quo warranto proceedings against business
entities, SAGs were an important part of this monitoring process, and
increasingly so during the period of rapid industrialization following the
Civil War.
In the early to mid-nineteenth century, and even through the
Gilded Age and into the Progressive Era, most quo warranto actions by
SAGs concerned the traditional use of this tool to oust an official from
an office held contrary to the law.59 However, with the rise of the large
corporation during the Gilded Age, coupled with the absence of a
strong administrative state able to monitor these entities, SAGs
increasingly expanded common law quo warranto proceedings to
include corporate defendants. At the heart of these lawsuits were
allegations that the defendant corporation had claimed unauthorized
privileges or failed to perform activities specified in the charter. The
general theory used against corporate entities in these lawsuits rested
upon an analogy to the traditional use of quo warranto to oust
individuals illegally claiming offices of the crown, with the SAGs
claiming that the corporate defendant's action or inaction violated a
contract between the holder of the charter and the state. Due to the
allegedly injurious nature of this conduct to the public at large, SAGs
frequently sought the strictest remedies available under this common
law quo warranto action – revocation of the charter and ouster of the
corporation from the state. This remedy was thus "one of corporate
death," representing "the extreme rigor of the law."60
A Lexis-Nexis search of state court decisions from 1865 to 1915
reveals approximately 400 quo warranto cases brought against
corporations over this period.61 This search is again likely
underestimating the total number of suits initiated by the SAGs by
including only resolved appellate court cases not settled out of court,
though it provides a good sense of the general use of this tool over
this period. Much like their use of public nuisance, SAGs used quo
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warranto to target a wide range of alleged corporate wrongdoing. This
included suing companies for engaging in business activities beyond
those specified in their corporate charters, similar to how the
Massachusetts SAG attempted to use public nuisance to prevent an ice
company from selling products other than ice. This usage was
particularly prevalent in litigation against insurance companies, which
often faced SAG litigation accusing them of selling different forms of
insurance than specifically authorized by its charter.62 SAGs also
brought lawsuits against companies for unlawfully collecting tolls on
highways or canals,63 neglecting duties under corporate charters to
provide certain products or services,64 failing to reveal corporate
information to the state or to maintain adequate capitalization,65
charging unreasonable amounts for services rendered such as bank
interest or telephone services,66 selling intoxicating beverages,67 and
failing to provide clean water to the public.68 In addition to their public
nuisance strategy, SAGs employed quo warranto proceedings against
the railroads for a variety of alleged wrongdoing.69
Quo warranto proceedings were used by SAGs across the
country, but particularly so in the Midwest, led by Ohio, Illinois, and
Missouri.70 Indeed, eight of the ten states most frequently using quo
warranto proceedings against corporations during this period were
Midwestern states, with only Pennsylvania and Texas among those
outside the Midwest. Table 1 indicates the regional variation in the use
of quo warranto lawsuits against corporations during this period.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
That the use of quo warranto to oust corporations from doing
business in the state was concentrated in states such as Ohio and
Illinois aligns with the general political activism calling for greater
business regulation across the Midwest and Great Plains during this
period.71 Unlike much of the South and in many states further to the
west, where calls for business regulation were also strong, these
states also contained sizeable industry presence and more opportunity,
if not need, for SAGs to use quo warranto procedures. As noted below,
Midwestern SAGs, including those of Illinois and Ohio, were particularly
prominent in employing high-profile common law quo warranto
lawsuits to combat the rise of the trusts in the late nineteenth century.
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Standard Oil attorney Samuel Dodd’s invention of the trust
device in 1879 was soon to have an explosive impact on American
society.72 Formally, "trusts" referred to the creation of large holding
companies that would purchase the stock of several smaller
companies, thus allowing the stockholders to combine capital and
control a larger portion of the market. As Dodd himself noted, the term
soon took on a wider significance, referring to every act done with the
intent to monopolize business, restrain trade, or fix prices.73 By 1888,
the New York Times and other leading newspapers blanketed their
pages with stories involving the latest growth of a new "trust."74 The
intense public outcry against these aggregations led to frantic efforts
to determine how to restrain their power.75 There was little consensus
among opponents of the trusts as to the best way in which to attack
these new entities, but several high-profile and successful actions
brought by SAGs demonstrated how the common law tools possessed
by these officials, including quo warranto powers, could be used in an
attempt to control the trusts. Many of these common-law concepts,
developed in large part by attorneys general, found their way into the
state and national statutes that created America's early antitrust
regime.
In these quo warranto suits, SAGs would claim that trusts
usurped powers not granted under their corporate charters, whether
these were special charters or issued under general incorporation
statutes. Most commonly, SAGs would allege that the charters did not
specifically authorize the corporation to buy and hold stock in other
companies, and that the power to do so could not be simply implied
from a legislative grant to engage in other activities (such as the
manufacture and sale of products).76 Other quo warranto strategies
relied on broader claims that the state incorporation statutes allowed
only "the transaction of any lawful business," and that because
contracts in restraint of trade were per se unlawful under the common
law, the trust went beyond the terms of the incorporation statute.77 In
these cases, the SAGs sought the remedy of ouster provided by
common law quo warranto. While this remedy was "one of corporate
death,"78 SAGs successfully obtained the dissolution of the targeted
trust in all of their early quo warranto cases. Table 2 illustrates this by
listing the SAG lawsuits against the largest and most notorious trusts
during this period.
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[TABLE 2 HERE]
In the cases against the trusts noted in Table 2, the SAGs used
quo warranto proceedings based upon the common law. Using this
power, the SAGs were able to convince courts that the trusts, by
forming monopolies and restraining competition within their particular
industries, had assumed powers "dangerous to the public weal"
beyond those granted in their corporate charters.79 They did so
independently from any distinct legislative or administrative authority
to control the trusts, relying instead on the common law.
The identities of the SAGs in these cases against the trusts
reflect to some extent the patterns of regional variation in the use of
quo warranto generally. The Ohio SAG was the first to bring litigation
against Standard Oil, and the SAGs in the Midwestern states of Illinois,
Nebraska, and Missouri also prosecuted high-profile actions against
trusts. Even so, the use of quo warranto against the trusts in
Louisiana, California, and New York indicate that this was not wholly a
regional phenomenon. The use of these lawsuits was also not the
exclusive province of any one party, as Democratic and Republican
SAGs alike brought quo warranto suits against the trusts at this time.
Quo warranto litigation by the SAGs was important in at least a
couple of ways. First and most directly, the litigation served as a
mechanism for directly regulating the activities of business, including
forcing corporate dissolution when the activities were contrary to the
public interest. In the early state cases against the trusts, the SAGs
achieved a series of high-profile successes. Secondly, SAG activities
had an important effect on the development of state and national
antitrust policy. Many state antitrust statutes, as well as the Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890, reflected a reaction to the SAGs’ quo warranto
cases brought against the trusts beginning in 1887. In fact, several
state statutes generally codified the new understandings of antitrust
quo warranto by expressly authorizing the SAGs to bring common law
antitrust actions.80
It comes as little surprise, therefore, that a number of SAGs
were active in helping craft the language for these early antitrust
statutes. For example, Texas’ strongly anti-monopoly Attorney
General, James Stephen Hogg, was a key actor in forming the state’s
anti-trust statute in March 1889.81 His previous experience battling the
railroads through a variety of legal techniques led him to emphasize
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the importance of preventing the formation of a monopoly in its early
stages. This was reflected throughout the law as he helped draft the
statute’s language together with a state legislative committee. Among
other things, the statute contained broad language declaring void all
contracts in restraint of trade and authorizing the SAG to initiate quo
warranto proceedings in the event of a statutory violation.82 Several
other states enacted statutes codifying the common law of quo
warranto as developed in SAG litigation. These new antitrust laws
allowed SAGs to file quo warranto actions against trusts, giving
statutory backing to actions previously based upon the common law.83
As noted below, SAGs continued bringing antitrust litigation in the last
decade of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth based upon
this statutory codification of their quo warranto powers.
The earliest quo warranto actions of the SAGs against the trusts
noted in Table 2 helped influence the debate over the national
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 as well. As soon as Congress first
began consideration of a federal antitrust bill in 1888, proponents of a
national statute had to address concerns that the proposed regulations
would signal a radical departure from existing law. To help reassure
opponents of the bill, including the most prominent critic of the
legislation, Senator James Z. George (D-MS), Sherman made the state
cases a key part of his defense of the antitrust bill. In his major speech
defending the bill on March 21, 1890, as well as in earlier speeches,
Sherman argued that his proposal represented a reasonable response
to the public outcry over the trusts – and one far preferable to
solutions that would be proposed by "the socialist, the communist, and
the nihilist" if Congress did not act.84 Sherman argued that far from
being radical, the proposed act "does not announce a new principle of
law, but applies old and well recognized principles of the common
law." He continued by noting that the "power of the State courts has
been repeatedly exercised to set aside such combinations."85 Sherman
quoted directly from these state cases, including the "very clear and
able opinion" of the New York court in the SAGs' case against the
Sugar Trust, which Sherman argued set out the rule of the common
law.86
While Sherman argued that the principles in this litigation were
"old and well recognized," the application to the emerging business
combinations was in fact novel. By using quo warranto in this new
way, the SAGs helped develop the common law and build the
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precedent necessary for Senator Sherman to make this claim that "the
common law" supported trust-busting. The existence of these state
cases helped to provide an appearance of continuity between ancient
legal principles and the aims of the Sherman Act, thus giving the Act
the appearance of simply codifying existing law, rather than creating a
new, far-reaching, or “radical” legal regime.
Additionally, the subsequent history of these state cases
bolstered Sherman's contention that federal action against the trusts
was necessary. Following the early success of quo warranto litigation
against the trusts, the SAGs soon discovered the limits of their ability
to effectively use the quo warranto power against business interests.
Most importantly, the trusts targeted in this state litigation
increasingly took advantage of loose incorporation laws in other states,
reorganizing themselves outside the reach of active state
prosecutors.87 In particular, New Jersey’s general incorporation law
adopted in 1889 contained the most liberal combination laws in the
country, allowing corporations dissolved by state quo warranto actions
to simply reorganize themselves as New Jersey corporations.88
Sherman noted that because state court decisions were limited
to the jurisdiction of their state, they were unable to alone adequately
address the problem. State prosecutions could deal with intra-state
combinations, but "only the General Government can deal with
combinations reaching not only the several States, but the commercial
world."89 The Sherman Act would "supplement the enforcement of the
established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the
several States" in addressing combinations engaging in practices
against the public interest.90 Given that the Sherman Act aimed to
"supplement" the states' role, it is not surprising that the SAGs’
enforcement powers were generally not preempted under the Sherman
Act or subsequent federal antitrust statutes.91 The lack of state
preemption was important in the years following the Sherman Act
because SAGs continued to bring antitrust litigation against trusts
based upon new state statutes. This was particularly important after
the Supreme Court limited the Sherman Act's application.
Following enactment of the Sherman Act, the federal DOJ prosecuted
few trusts under the law, a fact opponents of the trusts were quick to
point out.92 When federal prosecutors did enforce the law, as they did
against the American Sugar Refining Company, the U.S. Supreme
Court sharply limited the reach of the act. In United States v. E.C.
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Knight Co.93 (1895), the Court held that manufacturing (such as sugar
refining) was a local activity that the federal government was unable
to regulate under its Commerce Clause power. This interpretation had
the practical effect of eviscerating much of the power of the Sherman
Act for federal enforcement, with the Court stating that control of the
trusts belonged at the state level:
The relief of the citizens of each state from the burden of
monopoly and the evils resulting from the restraint of trade
among such citizens was left with the states to deal with, and
this court has recognized their possession of that power even to
the extent of holding that an employment or business carried on
by private individuals, when it becomes a matter of such public
interest and importance as to create a common charge or
burden upon the citizen - in other words, when it becomes a
practical monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to resort,
and by means of which a tribute can be exacted from the
community - is subject to regulation by state legislative power.94
Following E.C. Knight, SAGs became more heavily involved in
calling for stronger national legislation and constitutional amendments
to deal with the issue. Several statements to this effect were made
during the proceedings of the Chicago Conference on Trusts held on
September 13-16, 1899, which invited representatives "of all of the
leading interests in the different sections of the United States."95
Several SAGs attended and offered speeches, including a scathing
address by E.C. Crow from Missouri. Crow excoriated the trusts for
standing for "special privileges to the few, and unequal opportunities
for the many," arguing that because corporations were but
"creature[s] of the state and possessing only the power given it by the
state, it should never be able to act or conduct its business as to
interfere with the interests of the public." Crow also noted the effect
"loose incorporation laws" were having on antitrust enforcement,
leading him to argue that "our corporate laws must be remodeled." His
chief recommendation was for an assembly of the governors and
attorneys general to address this issue together and enact legislation
to close these corporate loopholes.96 Other SAGs, including the Texas
SAG, were more explicit about the necessity for "not only state
legislation, but also national legislation" to "remedy the wrong" of the
trusts and "protect the right of the people."97 Referencing E.C. Knight,
the Attorney General of Maryland called for amendments to both
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federal and state constitutions to allow for anti-trust legislation.98
Likewise, the Indiana SAG "look[ed] with confidence to the general
control of the entire subject by Congress" since the incorporation
"loophole" discovered by the trusts made it impossible for state efforts
to address the trust problem fully.99
In the meantime, the limitation on the federal power to deal
with monopolies announced in E.C. Knight thrust the issue back to the
states. SAGs indeed continued to bring quo warranto actions against
trusts at and beyond the turn of the twentieth century.100 These state
cases illustrate SAGs’ continuing role as key opportunity points for
trust opponents during the period between E.C. Knight and the "trustbusting" administration of Theodore Roosevelt. The beginning of the
revival of the Sherman Act during the first decade of the twentieth
century was precipitated in part by SAGs, through the initiation of
lawsuits against corporations such as the Northern Securities Company
(a litigation effort eventually leading to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Northern Securities Co. v. United States101 (1904)) and by forcing
federal acknowledgment of the limitations of purely state action
against the trusts.
Just as importantly for the SAGs' own institutional development,
the problem of the trusts helped lead to greater lines of coordination
among these state prosecutors. The increasing prevalence of
multistate corporations establishing themselves under general
incorporation statutes, and thus avoiding state quo warranto
prosecutions, was a major impetus for SAGs to begin coordinating
their efforts across state lines. Thirteen attorneys general met in St.
Louis in 1907 to discuss issues common to several states, agreeing to
establish a permanent national organization to present "a united
front...in legal actions brought by different States against the same
corporation or trust."102 Shortly after its creation, this new
organization, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG),
served as a resource for SAGs bringing further actions against the
trusts under state antitrust statutes. This included their first ever
coordinated lawsuits against Standard Oil during the first decade of the
twentieth century.103 NAAG remains in existence today and has been a
critical resource for modern-day SAGs bringing multistate litigation
against corporations in recent years.
The SAGs' use of quo warranto prosecutions against the trusts
was one part of a larger political struggle attempting to deal with new
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issues of rapid industrialization during the Gilded Age and into the
Progressive Era involving various state-level and federal actors. SAGs
across the country, and particularly in the Midwest, had been
increasingly using the common law of quo warranto throughout the
Gilded Age as a legal weapon to control business entities alleged to
have overstepped their role in promoting the public welfare. With the
emergence of the trusts, several SAGs employed this common law tool
against monopolies in the absence of existing state or federal statutes
to successfully dissolve a number of the largest combinations at the
time. Their prosecutions helped develop the common law, creating
continuity between "established legal principles" and the new and
emerging antitrust regulatory regime being created by state and
federal governments.
The use of quo warranto as a means of control of the trusts and
other corporations reflected a republican response to the growth of
business entities during post-Civil War industrialization. The chief
remedy pursued in quo warranto prosecutions – revocation of
corporate charters and subsequent "corporate death" – may seem
overly harsh to modern eyes, but at the time reflected a regulatory
approach viewing corporations as localized entities entrusted with
acting consistent with the public welfare. Ultimately, this approach was
challenged when, much as with their use of public nuisance, SAGs
found that their ability to use the common law to regulate emerging
business interests was limited. The use of loose general incorporation
laws in states like New Jersey made the individual states' use of quo
warranto prosecutions as a means to control the trusts largely
ineffective. The SAGs adjusted to this new regime by advocating a
larger federal role in antitrust, and in the meantime creating new lines
of communication and collaboration between themselves in an effort to
present a more united front against the trusts. The SAGs used this
collaboration, as well as their now-codified powers under antitrust
statutes, to attack the "trust problem" well into the twentieth century.

The Unique Role of the State Attorneys General
Much as private class action suits often exist parallel to actions
brought by state attorneys general in modern times, SAGs' lawsuits
were hardly the only actions brought against business interests at the
time. A number of private litigators brought actions against trusts, for
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example.104 Nevertheless, the office of the SAG had (and still have)
several institutional traits facilitating the role that they played in the
development of the law.
For one, the fact that SAGs could rely on common law powers
older than the United States itself granted them additional flexibility to
pursue emerging policy issues, especially when these common law
powers could be employed only by SAGs and not by private litigants.
As noted earlier, courts had long recognized a distinction between
public and private nuisance. Private litigants could bring actions based
upon both legal theories, but the bar for private parties to bring public
nuisance actions was placed quite high. As one leading legal treatise in
1893 restated the common law, "no person can maintain an action for
damages from a common nuisance where the injury and damage are
common to all."105 That private parties needed to prove special
damages in public nuisance actions while public parties (particularly
SAGs suing in the name of the state) did not meant that the ability to
enjoin harms done to the public at large rested largely with SAGs – a
legal advantage that SAGs employed frequently.
Likewise, only the state could initiate quo warranto lawsuits
under the common law, while private parties could not. This was
largely because quo warranto was an extraordinary legal remedy, and
its use thus restrained. These proceedings could only be used to
pursue the public interest, and could not be used for purely private
purposes. A Minnesota case from 1889 expresses a representative
view of quo warranto: "As such proceedings are in the nature of a
public prosecution, having for their object the recovery to the state of
a usurped or forfeited franchise, and not to redress private grievances,
no one but the attorney general has authority to institute or prosecute
them, it being exclusively for him to determine when public interests
require them to be instituted."106
The ability for SAGs to "exclusively" determine whether to use
quo warranto aligns with the general notion that SAGs had (and still
have) a great deal of flexibility and discretion in choosing the cases to
add to their docket. The common law provided a legal resource that
did not require express statutory or constitutional delegation, allowing
these officials the ability to pursue litigation independently of other
actors. One Texas court from 1893 sums up well the reason for
allowing SAGs such broad authority – namely, that when private
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individuals cannot enforce the public interest, the duty to guard the
public interest for them falls to the attorney general:
"It is an inherent function of his [the attorney general's] office
to protect the public through the courts when they are injured,
and have a cause of action. Who else could institute or direct a
suit for the public? Can it be said that the courts would be
closed to them, and that they would have no remedy against
wrong or usurpation, if there should be no express law directing
the attorney general to act? When there is a statute directing
him, giving a legal remedy, he must be guided by it, but if there
be [no statutes] the public are not for that reason deprived of
the right to resort to judicial proceedings for protection against
wrong."107
At a time when many viewed the legislatures and governors as
incapable of representing the public interest in the face of the political
power of business interests, the SAGs' broad common law powers
provided an opportunity point for pro-regulatory forces. This was true
in states like Ohio and New York, where the state legislatures for time
a time declined to enact antitrust legislation. Assisting this role of
SAGs as an additional opportunity point was the fact that nearly all
SAGs, and indeed all of the SAGs who brought the quo warranto suits
against the trusts listed in Table 2, were elected independently from
the governors and state legislatures and (unlike the U.S. Attorney
General) not under the control of other executive officials.108
A number of groups viewed SAGs as potential avenues through
which to pursue policy goals. For example, in 1888, at a time when the
emergence of the trusts led to a "thunderous outcry in the press,"109
the New York Times ran a series of editorials urging the New York SAG
to act, arguing that his quo warranto powers "should be tested in
proceedings against some corporation which has been swallowed up by
a Trust."110 An examination of the leading newspapers during this
period suggests that a wide range of groups made applications for the
attorney general to take action against business interests, including
the Knights of Labor, "disaffected stockholders," small, independent
producers urging action against monopolistic trusts, and a New York
citizen committee pressuring the SAG to use his quo warranto powers
to "force the Manhattan Elevated Railroad Company to provide a seat
for every passenger between rush hours, to make the stations
sufficiently large for the comfortable accommodation of travelers, and
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to equip every platform with adequate roofs."111 Likewise, the Illinois
SAG's lawsuit against the Chicago Gas Trust Company noted in Table 2
above followed an application by the Chicago Citizen's Association to
sue the trust.112
This could act as somewhat of a two-sided coin for SAGs, as
those who did not act were often subjects of public comment and
criticism. For example, the New York Times noted in 1890 that the
Massachusetts SAG’s failure to take action against the "offending
corporations" was "at last becoming the subject of comment in
Boston." The Times goes on to note that the editorial board of the
Boston Herald was also beginning to apply pressure on the attorney
general, arguing that "the time has now come" for the SAG "to put the
machinery of his office in operation for the purpose of testing the
matter."113 Much of this criticism arose out of the expectation of the
attorney general to act, particularly as "the people [were] to obtain
the relief to which they are entitled" only through "official
investigation, followed by actions brought in the courts by public
prosecutors."114 Because the attorney general had such broad control
over the representation of the public interest, much of the attention –
both positive and negative – focused on his office.
The broad control SAGs maintained over state litigation in turn
highlights another structural feature of the SAGs. SAGs maintain a
great deal of prosecutorial discretion in handling their caseload,
choosing whether or not to bring actions with little interference by
other officials. Because "[a]s the representative of the state, an
attorney-general is empowered to bring any action which he deems
necessary for the protection of the public interests,"115 the SAG has
the ability to define the "public interest" such that "as litigator [the
SAG] can substantially influence public policy."116 The SAGs’ wide
discretion allowed them the possibility of resisting public pressure. The
Massachusetts SAG mentioned above, for example, opted not to
prosecute the trusts despite the public pressure. Likewise, early in the
nineteenth century, the Kansas SAG settled with Standard Oil rather
than follow the public calls to prosecute, in large measure because of
his faith in the American free enterprise system and because he
apparently had no desire to punish a leading local industry.117
Further, the SAGs' role as public prosecutors allowed them to
cloak themselves in an appearance of neutrality even though they
were elected, political actors. This recalls political scientist Eugene
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Lewis's notion that a key practice by political entrepreneurs is their
creation of an “apolitical shield” making their actions appear "to be
free of partisanship, greed, self-interest and personal selfaggrandizement.118 Ohio SAG David K. Watson, for instance, framed
his participation in his lawsuit against Standard Oil as a "matter of
duty." As he put it, "I had no personal feeling against the Standard Oil
Company, but I meant to enforce the law against it as I would against
any other company which I believed to be violating the law."119 This
cloak of neutrality was important in the context of Ohio state politics at
the time, which was dominated on the state level by pro-business
Republicans wary of antitrust actions.120
Of course, many of Watson’s Republican colleagues in Ohio
disagreed that this was simply a matter of Watson’s "duty" such that
he had little choice in the matter.121 The same was true of other SAGs
who framed their actions as straightforward law enforcement
responding to corporate "abuses" or "violations" under law.122 Indeed,
critics of Democratic New York SAG Charles Tabor labeled his lawsuit
against the Sugar Trust a "Tammany Suit" because it allegedly aimed
to place pressure on Republicans in the General Assembly to enact
antitrust legislation.123 An official at the American Smelting and
Refining Company accused Colorado SAG C.C. Post, who had just
brought quo warranto suit against them, of bringing the suit for
"political purposes to curry favor with the Populists."124 Yet similarly to
judges cloaking themselves in the language of the law, it is easier as a
public prosecutor to publicly maintain that the decision to litigate is a
simple matter of neutrally "following the law" than it is for a legislator
or governor, whose actions are more likely to be seen as mere
"political decisions." This dynamic provides a partial explanation for
why Watson was able to sue Standard Oil successfully even with the
political deck stacked against him.125
In short, SAGs during the Gilded Age occupied a unique position
as a sort of "pressure release valve" for public anxieties existing
concurrent with the rise of large business interests. At a time in which
administrative agencies were weak or non-existent, and other political
actors had not or would not act, a number of SAGs responded to this
public outrage by relying on the tools and advantages inherent in their
office. Their electoral independence and wide prosecutorial discretion,
as well as their ability to cloak themselves in the neutrality of the law,
assisted their ability to act in the "public interest" and to reinforce a
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republican notion that the ultimate control of corporate power
rightfully resided with the public.

Conclusion
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
several SAGs used their unique position to pursue the "public interest"
by regulating the activities of the large commercial sector emerging in
America's Gilded Age by means of innovative common law litigation.
This activity evolved with changing circumstances throughout the
nineteenth century, as SAGs sought to achieve business regulation
through public nuisance theories, and, with the emergence of the
trusts, to vindicate the "public interest" by using quo warranto powers
against the trusts.
The SAGs' litigation during this time was important for a number
of reasons. For one, the SAGs' pursuit of the "public interest" during
this era serves as a partial corrective to the notion that the law during
the nineteenth century chiefly reflected governments' wish to enhance
the economic interests of private actors. As employed by SAGs, the
common law served not as a barrier to "democratic excess," but as an
expression of the public's interest vis-à-vis the great corporations.
Contrary to bolstering liberal "laissez-faire" ideologies, this common
law regulation through litigation reflected a certain republicanism in
viewing the rightful role of corporations as expressions of the public
interest. To that end, SAGs were willing to use injunctions and even
seek "corporate death" through quo warranto if corporations abused
their role.
The SAGs' common law litigation also highlights an
underappreciated way in which entrepreneurial actors could seek
stricter regulation of corporations at a time in which administrative
solutions were largely unavailable. Several of the perceived social ills
targeted by the SAGs' litigation – environmental harms, the "trusts",
problems caused by the railroads – faced regulatory controls weaker
than that demanded by key elements of the public. While proregulatory forces pushed for a stronger regulatory state to address
these emerging issues of industrialization, they simultaneously looked
to other avenues to potentially achieve these goals. SAG common law
litigation was one such avenue available to fill the widening "regulatory
gaps" during this period. As state actors clothed with electoral
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independence from other state political institutions and the ability to
represent the state in litigation, SAGs provided a promising avenue for
a public demanding action, even if other institutions seemed to be
turning a deaf ear. SAGs such as Ohio's David Watson were able to
use their institutional advantages to channel public outrage against the
"trusts" even in the context of institutional hostility.
While the SAGs' efforts to use the common law in this way often
ran into limitations, their litigation often achieved at least short-term
success in court. Further, the SAGs’ efforts to develop the common law
had an influence on the development of state and national antitrust
policy, providing a precedent for the government's role in attacking
trusts. In this way, SAG common law litigation served as an important
bridge between existing regulatory gaps and the more systematic
regulatory state that emerged in the Progressive Era and New Deal
period.
The regulatory "gap-filling" role of this early SAG common law
litigation also helps to place the role of modern-day SAGs in greater
context. Initially, with the creation of the federal and state
administrative state and the explosion of statutory law that occurred in
the twentieth century, the SAGs' use of the common law to regulate
business dwindled.126 In more recent times, however, these state
public prosecutors have revived common law litigation. Recently, for
example, SAGs have used common law public nuisance theories to
tackle a variety of public harms not explicitly regulated by statute or
administrative regulation. The most prominent recent litigation
campaign involved the numerous SAG lawsuits targeting the nation's
largest tobacco firms in the late 1990s, which ultimately ended in a
massive $200+ billion settlement containing new regulations on the
industry and involving nearly all the nation's SAGs.127 Among other
causes of action in this litigation, SAGs included claims for public
nuisance, arguing that the tobacco companies' marketing and
distribution practices "intentionally and unreasonably interfered with
the public's right to be free from unwarranted injury, disease and
sickness, and have caused damage to the public health, the public
safety and the general welfare of the citizens."128 While having a
significant impact on national tobacco regulation, this effort occurred
in the face of congressional and administrative inaction on the issue.
SAGs have also used public nuisance theories to tackle problems of
climate change left largely unaddressed by Congress, attempting to
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gain injunctions against power plants emitting large amounts of carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere.129 Other recent SAG uses of common law
public nuisance theories include lawsuits against manufacturers of
firearms and lead paint.130
In these cases, as with the public nuisance cases of their
predecessors in the Gilded Age, SAGs have used the common law to
address emerging public issues when administrative or legislative
approaches to tackling these problems had not been implemented. For
Gilded Age SAGs, public nuisance served as a regulatory tool in the era
before the fully developed post-New Deal administrative state. For
contemporary SAGs, public nuisance has served as a regulatory device
when other political actors – such as Congress or the Environmental
Protection Agency – had declined to regulate certain alleged harms.
Unlike public nuisance, which has witnessed a renaissance
among SAG litigants in recent years, the common law tool of quo
warranto is no longer an important part of the SAGs' legal repertoire.
As noted above, several states codified in their antitrust statutes the
SAGs' early use of quo warranto to attack monopolies, but the use of
quo warranto generally left usage largely because the emergence of
loose general incorporation statutes made the use of this extraordinary
legal remedy impractical, and because the chief legal remedy
associated with quo warranto – revocation of corporate charters and
subsequent "corporate death" – was viewed as too blunt a weapon.
However, the SAGs' use of quo warranto in antitrust
prosecutions played a role in the SAGs' own institutional development,
as the difficulty of the SAGs' early antitrust regime to control the trusts
led to the SAGs modernizing their own legal mechanisms. The SAGs'
formation of the National Association of Attorneys General was
precipitated by the long-term ineffectiveness and inefficiencies of
single-state prosecution of the trusts. Through this new organization,
the SAGs combined efforts against the trusts and other corporate
entities, thus avoiding duplication and allowing better legal
coordination against corporate enterprises increasingly operating
across state lines. NAAG still exists today as a forum for SAG
collaboration and has been critical in coordinating recent litigation
initiated by SAGs, including those modern-day campaigns noted
above.131
State attorneys general were among the many actors during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helping to craft legal and
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political development during this key era of industrialization. Scholars
exploring political development during this period should consider the
role of public prosecutors, along with state judges, legislatures, and
private interest groups, in this development. Particularly as modernday SAGs make headlines with their "regulation through litigation" in
areas from tobacco policy to global warming, the actions of SAGs
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries serve as a
reminder that government prosecutors' use of litigation to regulate
business has roots tracing back to the early days of American
industrialization.
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Table 1. Quo Warranto Litigation against Corporations, By Region, 18651915

Region Number of Cases % of Cases
Northeast
60
14.9%
South
40
9.9%
Midwest
272
67.5%
West
31
7.7%
Source: Author's compilation from searches of the Lexis-Nexis legal database

Table 2. Significant State Attorney General Quo Warranto Litigation Against
the Trusts
State

SAG
Party

Defendant

Year
Initiated

Litigation Result

LA

D

American Cotton Oil Trust
("the Cottonseed Trust")

1887

Enjoined from
doing business in
state

NY

D

1888

Dissolution of trust

IL

R

1888

Dissolution of trust

CA

D

1889

Dissolution of trust

NE

R

1890

Dissolution of trust

OH

R

1890

Ousted from trust

IL

D

1894

Dissolution of Trust

IL

D

1895

Dissolution of Trust

MO

D

1902

Ordered to pay
fines and costs

CO

Populist

1902

Dismissed on
procedural grounds

North River Sugar Refining
Company
("the Sugar Trust")
Chicago Gas Trust Company
("the Gas Trust")
American Sugar Refining
Company
("the Sugar Trust")
Nebraska Distilling Company
("the Whisky Trust")
Standard Oil
("the Oil Trust")
United States School
Furniture Company ("the
Furniture Trust")
Distilling and Cattle Feeding
Company
("the Whisky Trust")
Armour Packing Company
("the Meat-Packing Trust")
American Smelting and
Refining Company ("the
Smelter Trust")

Source: Author's compilation from searches of the Lexis-Nexis legal database
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